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TRANSBORDER DATA FLOW: AN OVERVIEW 
AND CRITIQUE OF RECENT CONCERNS 
by I. TR01TER HARDY' JR •• 
"Transborder data flow"("TDF") is a recently coined term that 
refers to the transmission of data or information over national 
boundaries. 1 Transmission can be effected in a variety of ways, 
including the telephone and the mails, but recent concerns over TDF 
center on the newer, and typically public, media of radio, television, 
and computerized information. The broadcast media are of increas-
ing concern because technological and economic developments now 
permit direct home reception of satellite transmissions. Although 
private homes equipped with dish-shaped antennas able to pick up 
international signals are much the exception today, the growth of 
such home antennas could easily pose serious problems for nations 
desiring to control the "importation" of foreign radio and television 
programs.ll 
The focus of this paper, however, is not on the broadcast media 
but rather is on the transmission of computerized information over 
international computer networks. The paper will present an over-
view of the technology involved, will indicate the type of informa-
tion currently being transmitted internationally and will summarize 
and critique a number of concerns arising from this international 
trade in information. 
THE TECHNOLOGY 
Although lay persons often have no clear idea of the nature of "the 
transmission of computerized information," 3 the basis of that trans-
mission is actually quite simple. Samuel F.B. Morse laid the founda-
tion for the conversion of letters and digits into a pattern of dots and 
• Assistant Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William 
&: Mary; B.A. University of Virginia (1968); M.S. American University (1974); J.D. 
Duke University (1981). 
1. See generally McGuire, The Information Age: An Introduction to Transbor-
der Data Flow, JuRIMETRJCS J., Fall 1979 at 1. "International information flow'' is 
another term with the same meaning. 
2. This possibility has provoked considerable international attention already.See 
Poulantzas, Direct Satellite Telecommunications: State Sovereignty v. Freedom of 
Information, 23 CHITTY's L. J. 87 (1975). 
3. The transmission of such information is frequently termed "digital" or "data" 
transmission as well; the latter term developed in connection with computer commun-
ication over telephone lines and is often contrasted with "voice communication," or 
ordinary human use of the telephone system. 
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dashes in 1838.4 Morse assigned a unique pattern to each letter of the 
alphabet, and transmitted messages by making a buzzing or clicking 
sound over a set of wires in accordance with the appropriate dot-
dash pattern. 5 Modern computers no longer use the Morse code, but 
they do use other codes that work in a directly analagous fashion: 
they rely on a unique pattern of electrical pulses, each one called a 
"bit," to encode each letter, digit and punctuation mark needed for 
transmission. 
Because almost any type of information can be encoded as a 
pattern of bits and stored on a computer, computers are used to 
transmit every imaginable type of information, from federal reserve 
system bank balances and supermarket inventories to scientific ab-
stracts and Supreme Court cases. These transmissions are carried 
over a variety of media: many go over the telephone network; oth-
ers, and particularly transoceanic communications, go over satellite 
transmission facilities; and many go over both cable and satellite. 8 
BusiNESs-RELATED INFORMATION FLow 
A number of companies offer computer service over networks 7 
that extend across national boundaries. Among them are the General 
Electric Corporation, Computer Sciences Corporation, Control 
Data Corporation, and the Tymshare Corporation. 8 These and other 
corporations often offer as a service their networks alone-the cus-
tomer has his own computer and merely buys the communications 
service to connect to it. 9 A great many multinational corporations 
routinely keep their headquarters apprised of foreign subsidiaries' 
activities by means of computer communications. 
4. 12 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 458 (1983) (entry for "Morse, Samuel F. B."). 
5. For example, the message "hello" could be sent with the pattern: dot-dot-dot-
dot (H], dot [E], dot-dash-dot-dot [L], dot-dash-dot-dot [L], dash-dash-dash [0]. 
6. Mead Data Central"s LEXIS service, e.g., is sold in England over an undersea 
cable with a satellite link as a backup in case the cable communication fails. Personal 
conversation with Mr. Steve Bartron, Salesman, Mead Data Central Corp., Washing-
ton, D.C., (October 23, 1980} [hereinafter cited as "Bartron conversation" ]. 
7. A computer network is typically just a collection of cables leased more-or-less 
permanently from a telephone company, perhaps coupled with bandwidth leased 
from a satellite-operating company. 
8. See any recent major city "yellow pages" telephone directory under "Data 
Processing Services." 
9. General Telephone and Electronics, Inc. (GTE} operates a subsidiary called 
Telenet, for example, that sells a network service to computer service bureaus and 
other computer users. 
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The Eaton Corporation, for example, uses a European network 
that ties England, Germany, Italy, France, and Monaco together. 
European information is funneled to England, where an overseas 
connection with a similar United States-wide network enables corpo-
rate data to flow to the States and back again. 10 A vice president of 
the Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company of Chi-
cago, Robert E.L. Walker, has stated that his bank's European 
branches daily transmit records of banking transactions to a com-
pany communications center in Brussels, Belgium. Once the infor-
mation is verified for accuracy in Brussels, it is transmitted over a 
telephone cable to a computer center in Chicago, where the bank's 
records are processed and stored. Daily reports are in turn transmit-
ted back over the same communications system to the European 
offices.U 
INFORMATION As A CoMMODITY 
These crucial business transmissions are just one type of interna-
tional information exchange; more and more, information as a com-
modity is being sold around the world, constituting an increasingly 
important component of world trade in its own right. A good exam-
ple of information as a commodity is Mead Data Central's LEXIS/ 
NEXIS service. 
LEXIS is the legal research system that allows subscribers selec-
tively to retrieve a variety of legal materials-principally cases and 
statutes-from a computer located in Miamisburg, Ohio. 12 Until 
recently, LEXIS was almost exclusively sold in the Uniteds States 
and therefore had little to do with international trade. In mid-1980, 
however, LEXIS made available to its customers a number of British 
legal materials, including case law, statutes, and certain tax materi-
als.13 These libraries are available to American lawyers, but are 
marketed principally in England; lawyers there use the same com-
puter in Ohio that other LEXIS users use. 14 A form of LEXIS con-
10. Statement of Earl Kendle, Vice-President of Information Systems, Eaton Cor-
poration, in 3 TRANSNATIONAL DATA REPoRT, May 1980, at 14. 
11. Statement of Robert E.L. Walker in 3 TRANSNATIONAL DATA REPORT, May 
1980, at 15, 16. 
12. Barton conversation, supra note 6. 
13. LEXIS Brief/4, January 1980 at 1 ("Brief' is a newsletter put out by Mead 
Data Central for its LEXIS subscribers). 
14. Barton conversation, supra note 6. 
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taining French law is also currently being sold to subscribers in 
France. 15 These sales to England and France constitute a true inter-
national trade in information as a commodity. 
Mead Data Central also offers a service called "NEXIS," which 
consists of a variety of news articles and general information stored 
with LEXIS on the same Ohio computer. Among other sources, the 
NEXIS system contains-in computerized form-the Washington 
Post, Newsweek magazine, the news stories from the Associated 
Press wire service, 16 the British Broadcasting Corporation's Sum-
mary of World Broadcasts, 17 much of the Japanese Kyodo English-
Language News Service, and the Japanese Jiji Press English-lan-
guage economics and general news publications. 18 These foreign 
materials are updated daily; their sale over LEXIS/NEXIS terminals 
illustrates a purchase of "raw materials" (news service stories) in the 
international market, transportation of these materials over telecom-
munications lines to the United States for processing (loading into a 
computer), and their eventual resale in both the American and 
British markets. 
Similar international trade in information is carried on by other 
companies. The Systems Development Corporation, for example, 
offers a computerized information service called "Orbit." Orbit con-
tains abstracts of articles from a variety of scientific and other disci-
plines. The information is purchased from suppliers in the United 
States, Canada, and England and is sold over communications lines 
in London, Sydney, Tokyo, Paris, and a host of other cities in 
Canada, South America, and, of course, the United States. 19 
PRoBLEMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION MARKET 
The growing trade in information as a commodity, as well as the 
sharply increasing use of computerized information as a necessary 
by-product of multinational business and trade in tangible commod-
ities and money, has not been free of problems. At least three con-
cerns over the international information business have arisen since 
the early 1970s, at first chiefly in Europe, Canada, and Japan, but 
15. ld. 
16. LEXIS Brief/4, January 1980, at 1, Col. 2. 
17. LEXIS Brief/5, May 1980, at 4, Col. 2. 
18. LEXIS Brief/6, October 1980, at 3, Col. 2. 
19. Interview with Ms. Chris Revelle, Systems Analyst with the Systems Develop-
ment Corporation, in Washington, D.C. {Oct. 23, 1980). 
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lately in the less-developed countries as well: the erosion of national 
sovereignty, the loss of individuals' privacy, and the stifling of local 
information industries under the dominance of the United States. As 
we shall see, all three of these concerns have frequently given rise to 
nontariff barriers to information flow, barriers that reflect the inex-
haustible ability of nations to devise protectionist measures when 
free trade appears to threaten national interests. 
Loss of National Sovereignty. A fear that the export of informa-
tion will result in an "erosion of ... sovereignty and [will exacer-
bate] the already serious imbalance in the distribution of economic 
control" in Canada has been expressed by several Canadian govern-
ment and academic leaders. 20 Examples of the perceived problem 
include the use of a computer in Atlanta, Georgia, to maintain 
accounts on oil company credit card holders nominally billed from 
offices in Montreal and Toronto. 21 
As a result, Canada and the Canadian provinces have enacted 
some one hundred statutes that prohibit the export of certain types of 
information, such as credit histories. 22 Canadian worries over essen-
tial information being stored outside national borders have been 
forcefully expressed: extra-territorial storage "can result in a na-
tional self-perception of impotence, an inability to effect one's vital 
choices, and the effective erosion of one's political sovereignty." 23 
A major Canadian study of Canadian information processing and 
telecommunications, typically referred to as the Clyne Report, de-
fines national sovereignty as "the ability of Canadians . . . to exer-
cise control over the direction of economic, social, cultural, and 
political change."24 In an effort to regain the control "lost" to the 
20. Gotlieb, Dalfen & Katz, The Transborder Transfer of Information by Com-
munications and Computer Systems: Issues and Approaches to Guiding Principles, 68 
AM. J. INT'L L. 227, 247 (1974). Messrs. Gotlieb and Katz, associated with the 
Canadian Office of Manpower and Immigration, and the Department of Communi-
cations, respectively, wrote in their personal capacities. Mr. Dalfen was associated 
with the University of Toronto law faculty . 
.21. Id. at 246. 
22. Eger, Emerging Restrictions on Transnational Data Flows: Privacy Protection 
or Non-Tariff Trade Barriers?, 10 LAw & PoL. INT'L Bus. 1055, 1079 (1978). 
23. Gotlieb, supra note .20, at 247. 
24. Consultative committee on the implications of telecommunications for Cana-
dian Sovereignty, Canadian Dep't of Communications, Telecommunications and 
Canada (CLYNE lU:PoRT)(1979) at 1, quoted in Eger, The Global Phenomenon of 
Teleinformatics: An Introduction, 14 CoRNELL IN"t'L L. J . .203, .224 & n.ll1 (1981). 
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United States, Canada recently enacted statutes requiring that all 
data produced by Canadian banks be processed in Canada, unless 
special exemptions are obtained. 25 In practical terms, this require-
ment means that the banks must rely on computers located in Can-
ada, not in the United States. It is not a requirement with trifling 
consequences: on the average, data processing in Canada is from 
twenty to twenty-five percent more expensive than it is in the United 
States. 26 
The United States, of course, is still the repository of much of the 
world's computerized information simply because its computer tech-
nology is more ·advanced than the rest of the world's. 27 Loss of 
national sovereignty is therefore not a concern for Americans, but is 
it truly a realistic concern even for other industrialized nations like 
Canada?28 
Surely the Canadians are correct in fearing· that innundation by 
American radio, television, news magazines, films and so on will 
likely cause a dilution and erosion of Canadian culture and perhaps 
national sovereignty, but one finds it hard to understand how sover-
eignty can be eroded by the exportation of information. 29 Unlike 
most raw materials, information is not an exhaustible commodity-
it can be mined again and again from original sources, and it can 
even more readily be duplicated as needed. If it is true that "[t]he 
transfer of Canadian data to Amerian data banks means that . . . 
Americans will have the means to make decisions about Canadi-
25. Banks and Banking Law Revision Act, 1980, Can. Stat. Ch. 40, §§ 157 (4), 
(5), and (6). 
26. Telecommunications and Information Products and Services in International 
Trade: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protec-
tion, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 11 (1981) (statement of Dr. Oswald H. Genley, Cambridge, Mass.) [hereinafter 
cited as House Hearings]. 
'l:l. For example, the United States presently supplies over 70% of the world's 
computers, Ramsey, Europe Responds to the Challenge of the New Information 
Technologies, 14 CoRNELL INT'L L. J. 237, 239 (1981), and features a telecommunica-
tions market of some $18 to 20 billion per year (1980), nearly twice that of its nearest 
competitor, the combined nations of Europe, see House Hearings, supra note 26, at 
104 (statement of John Sodolski, Vice-President, Electronic Industries Ass'n). 
28. A justifiable pride in the sophistication of its communications industry makes 
this question particularly appropriate for Canada. See Gotlieb, Some Social and Legal 
Implications of New Technology: The Impact of Communications and Computers, 51 
CAN. B. REv. 246, 246-47 (1973). For an example of just how sophisticated the 
Canadian communications industry is, see Madden, Videotex in Canada, 3 CoMPUTER 
CoMMUNICATIONS 58 (1980) (describing some advanced information services being 
readied for public sale). 
29. See note 32 infra. 
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ans," 30 then it would seem equally true that the United States' export 
of information to Canada-by radio, television, magazines, etc.-
would give Canadians "the means to make decisions about" Ameri-
cans. If it is also true that "to the extent [they] lack data about 
themselves ... [Canadians] will be unable to make important deci-
sions affecting their future," 31 then that truth is no more than a 
simple observation that has always held since long before the advent 
of computers and modern communications. If a nation's information 
for decision making is being sent abroad for use by foreign compan-
ies, it can hardly be deemed vital, or else it would already have been 
collected and used by the nation itself. Laws banning the outflow of 
information from a democratic country like Canada make less sense 
from the standpoint of the Canadian government's capacity for deci-
sion making than laws authorizing the government to collect its own· 
data or to buy it from companies that do. 32 
Nations less industrialized than Canada are also concerned about 
a loss of national sovereignty caused by a loss of control over infor-
mation. For the third-world nations, national sovereignty is defined 
by one commentator as "a country's desire to control its own infor-
mation resources and the advantages flowing therefrom." 33 Again, 
the concern is that "critical information ... is being stored [abroad] 
especially in the United States." 34 Part of the concern is that infor-
mation stored abroad may be vulnerable to technical malfunctions 
or even sabotage. 35 But part of the concern is also over loss of control 
over economic, social, and political decisions. 36 
Loss of control over decisions seems, as in the case of Canada, an 
empty fear. How is it that a foreign country can make decisions 
about another country, except to the extent that one country, such as 
30. Gotlieb, supra note 20, at 247. 
31. ld. 
32. Canadians do, to be sure, have genuine concerns over the "Americanization" 
of Canada, see, e.g., Cohen, Canada and the United States-Possibilities for the 
Future, 12 CoLUM J. TRANSNATIONAL L. 196, 198-200 (1973), but this paper argues 
that an outflow of information is not properly a part of these concerns. 
33. Bortnick, International Information Flow: The Developing World Perspec-
tive, 14 CoRNELL INT'L L. J. 333, 338 (1981). 
34. Hurtado, Tug of War Over Computers, South: The Third World Magazine, 
January 1982, at 28. 
35. Bortnick, supra note 33, at 339. Though the concern is doubtless genuine, one 
wonders why computers in the United States should be thought to be more vulnerable 
than computers in a third-world nation. 
36. Hurtado, supra note 34, at 28. 
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Brazil, is a debtor to foreign banks or other nations? 37 How would 
more control over its information resources have helped Brazil avoid 
the leverage over its internal affairs possessed by foreign creditors? 
Indeed, Brazil is one of the less developed nations that has aggres-
sively sought-and to a large extent achieved-a tight control over 
its information resources. In 1972 it centralized control over the 
purchase of computers by the national government. 38 Later, it ex-
tended control to computer purchases by private industry, and es-
tablished a national information policy. 39 Today, Brazilians may not 
lawfully use computers located outside of Brazil if local Brazilian 
computers can accomplish the necessary processing. 40 To ensure that 
Brazilian computers are available, the country has been buying 
. computer equipment at a prodigious rate, estimated as far back as 
1975 to have been $275 million a year. 41 
One of the things that the less developed countries may be unable 
to do with the computers and software they currently possess is 
process information about their own natural resources when that 
information is in the form of satellite photographs. These countries 
would like to have free access to this information, collected by other 
nations including the United States, insofar as it relates to them. 42 
Though the problems of satellite data collection and transmission 
are outside the scope of this article, two reflections are worth noting 
quickly. First, the nation lacking access to information about its own 
natural resources may well be put in an inferior bargaining position 
in relation to, for example, United States companies who want to 
negotiate mining contracts.'3 Second, to the extent that an unequal 
bargaining position, caused by the parties' being unequally knowl-
edgeable, reflects a "wrong" or remediable state of affairs, the natu-
ral resources problem seems to be the only identifiable problem to 
37. See Bennett, IMF Plans Pressure on Banks to Help Brazil, N.Y. Times, Dec. 
15, 1982, at Dl, col. 1; Who Will Pay for Brazil's Devaluation, Bus. WK., March 7, 
1983, at 27-28. See also Diehl, Internal Pressure Builds in Brazil For Large-Scale Debt 
Renegotiation, Wash. Post, June 2, 1983, at D1, col. 1. 
38. Bortnick, supra note 33, at 340-41. 
39. Id. 
40. Id; Hurtado, supra note 34, at 29. 
41. Bortnick, supra note 33, at 340. Brazil is not alone. In 1980, Korea contracted 
for electronic equipment in amounts that "may reach close to $2 billion by the late 
1980's," Hause Hearings, supra note 26, at 24 (statement of Jane Bortnick, Analyst in 
Information Science and Technology, Congressional Research Service, Library of 
Congress). 
42. See Eger, supra note 24, at 232 & n.l77. 
43. See Bortnick, supra note 33, at 338 n.27. 
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have arisen to date. No other concrete example of a loss of national 
sovereignty caused by a loss of control over information appears in 
the literature. One questions whether the natural resources example 
itself truly illustrates a problem either of national sovereignty or of a 
"loss of control .. over anything once .. in control. .... 
Loss of Individual Control and Privacy. Another concern over 
transnational information flow is that individuals will lack the 
means of correcting erroneous information about themselves, if that 
information resides outside of their nation's jurisdiction.45 Two sim-
ple remedies suggest themselves. First, a nation could easily require 
that information not be collected from its citizens without an express 
contractual agreement that the provider of the information have 
convenient access to, and an ability to correct, that information. 
Second, foreign entities collecting such information could be re-
quired to form local subsidiaries or affiliates, or to have local agents, 
that would be susceptible to the nation's jurisdiction. If necessary, 
bond could be posted. These types of remedies would be more sensi-
ble than, for example, the apparent pressure exerted on United 
States companies to keep data in Canada. 46 
In fact, the Scandinavian countries have moved to ensure the 
protection of their citizens' privacy by more than mere pressure. 
Before anyone can send personal information out of Sweden, for 
example, he must first receive the approval of the Swedish Data 
Inspectorate. 47 Approval is not automatic. On one occasion the In-
spectorate refused to allow the German firm, Siemens, to transmit 
personnel records from one of its Swedish subsidiaries to a computer 
in Germany. 48 Twice, the Inspectorate has also refused to permit 
44. One commentator on the concerns of the less developed countries adds that 
those countries complain of a lack of access to technical information generally, not just 
to natural resources information. See Bortnick, supra note 33, at 335. 
Yet, technical information is available from a number of sources, principally techni-
cal publications, patents, and "know-how" licenses. Publications and patents are 
freely available from most nations for a modest price; know-how licenses, though 
more costly, are widely available also. Indeed, one of the United States' biggest exports 
is know-how. See House Hearings, supra note 26, at 150 (testimony of David Birch, 
Director, Program on Neighborhood and Regional Change, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology). 
45. E.g., Gotlieb et al., supra note 20, at 247. 
46. At one time, a U.S. insurance company was pressured to set up a Toronto 
office to maintain its Canadian business data in Canada. Pantages & Pipe, A New 
Headache for International DP, Datamation, June 1977, at ll8. 
47. Eger, supra note 22, at 1067 & nn.49-50. 
48. Bing, Transnational Data Flows and the Scandinavian Data Protection Legis-
lation, 1980 ScAND. STUDIES IN LAw 65, 78. 
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personal information about Swedish citizens to be processed in the 
United Kingdom. 49 
In the latter instance, the Inspectorate was evidently concerned 
that the United Kingdom had no laws to protect the privacy of the 
information. 50 Indeed, a sort of rule of thumb may become increas-
ingly common: personal information cannot be transmitted abroad 
to a nation with weaker privacy protection laws than the sending 
nation. 51 
Norway, Denmark, and Austria also require prior approval by a 
governmental body on a case by case basis before information can be 
sent across their borders. Though the Norwegian statute allows ex-
ceptions from the clearance procedure, as of 1982 none had been 
granted. 52 In Denmark, data cannot even be gathered for export 
without a license from the Data Surveillance Authority, 53 though the 
Danish law exempts from the licensing requirement flows to coun-
tries meeting enumerated standards of privacy protection. 54 Austria's 
statute, like its Danish counterpart, requires case by case approval of 
transborder data flows and sets out substantive privacy standards, 
exempting from individual scrutiny only countries complying with 
these standards. 55 In addition, the statute exempts intracorporate 
transmissions of data, 56 which is an enormous benefit to multina-
tional corporations. 
France requires international transmitters of personal data to reg-
ister with the National Data Processing and Liberties Commission. 57 
Transmissions are generally not examined individually, unlike the 
practice in Denmark, Austria, and Norway, but the French statute 
confers discretionary authority to subject selected activities to prior 
approval. 58 
Similar to the French statute, the West German Privacy Law does 
not require advance trans border data flow approval. 59 Transmitters 
are required to report their activities and meet detailed privacy 
49. Id. at 73. 
50. Id. 
51. See id. 
52. Feldman and Garcia, National Regulation of Transborder Data Flows, 7 
N.C.J. INT'L & CoM. REc. 1, 17 (1982). 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 17-18. 
55. Id. at 18-19. 
56. Id. at 19. 
57. Id. at 15-16. 
58. Id. at 16. 
59. Id. at 15. 
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standards; the German regulatory authority may prevent transmis-
sions that are noncompliant. 60 
Several other European countries are just now beginning to regu-
late data flows, including the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, Italy, 
and Belgium.61 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
("OECD") has drafted guidelines concerning transnational data 
communications and privacy protection and has attempted to recon-
cile the conflicting interests of privacy and free flow of informa-
tion. 82 The OECD report defines eight principl~ whose goal is to 
restrict data assimilation to that required for specific, necessary 
tasks, to insulate data compilations from unauthorized access, and to 
see that data collected are accurate. 63 The report encourages trans-
national data flow between countries observing the guidelines.64 
Limitations based on a genuine concern for personal privacy make 
some sense. They give rise, unfortunately, to a host of choice-of-law 
problems. Suppose, for example, the privacy laws of a foreign nation 
storing personal information are violated and the privacy of a do-
mestic nation's citizen is compromised. What law is applied: the 
foreign nation's? the domestic nation's? the nation from within 
whose borders the accessing terminal is located? More variations are 
possible and have already been foreseen, 65 although none seems a 
wholly satisfactory answer. Perhaps a contractual choice-of-law pro-
vision will emerge as the best compromise, 66 though efforts to en-
courage that development so far have had little effect. 87 
Loss of privacy because of the growth of computerized record 
keeping, as distinct from a loss of control over the correctness of 
those records, is a legitimate concern, not only for Canada, Europe, 
and Japan, but for the United States as well.88 It is not, however, a 
60. ld. 
61. Id. at 20-21. . 
62. Recommendations of the Council Governing the Protection of Privacy and 
Transborder Flows of Personal Data, OECD Doc. C(80)58 (Oct. 1, 1980}, discussed in 
Note, Transborder Dato Flows: Personal Daw, 22 HARv. INT'L L.J. 241 (1981). 
63. Id. at 241-44. 
64. Id. at 245. 
65. See Bing, supra note 48, at 90-94. 
66. See, e.g., Note, Contracts for Transnational lnfonnation Seroices: Securing 
Equivalency of Dato Protection, 22 HARv. INT'L L.J. 157, 171-75 (1981). 
67. The Council of Europe and the U.N. Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development have designed choice-of-law clauses for incorporation in national 
laws or treaties. No one appears to be using them. Bing, supra note 48, at 88. 
68. See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 codified at 5 
U.S.C. § 552a (1976}, amended at 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a (1983}, cited in Eger, supra note 
22, at 1078 n.129. 
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concern unique to, or even especially exacerbated by, the extra-
territorial storage of information. Certainly a requirement for keep-
ing personal records on computers located within national bounda-
ries would not alleviate the problem of too many personal records 
being kept on computers. 
Protectionism and the Information Industry. The need for na-
tional sovereignty and individual privacy does not explain all the 
steps taken by nations to curtail the transmission of information for 
extra-territorial computer storage; further explanations lie else-
where. These steps look very much like another form of non-tariff 
barrier imposed by nations to protect their own information indus-
tries.69 Some of the moves, such as those-taken by Canada,'0 respond 
. subtly to the United States' pressing leadership in the information 
processing field; others respond less subtly. Germany, for example, 
recently enacted a provision requiring that any company bringing a 
leased communications line into the country agree to perform "sub-
stantial data processing" inside of Germany on any information 
received over the line before that information can be retransmit-
ted.71 
Japan has similarly shown a solicitous regard for its own rapidly 
developing information and communications industry. The Control 
Data Corporation, for example, found itself faced with a protection-
ist reaction as early as 1974 when it attempted to establish a United 
States-to-Japan network link. After extensive delays in approving the 
computer company's lease of an essential communications cable, the 
Kokusai Denshin Denwa Company, Ltd. (the Japanese equivalent of 
Western Union) imposed such severe restrictions on the lease provi-
sions that Control Data frankly accused the Japanese of "[c]urtailing 
Control Data's ability to compete [so as to give] a competitive ad-
vantage to the Japanese domestic telephm:ie company .... " 72 
Eventually, the KDD did allow Control Data to sell remote com-
puter services in Japan, but only services from a single computer 
location in the United States. 73 This restriction prevented Control 
Data from offering different services in different Japanese markets 
69. See generally Eger, supra note 22. 
70. See supra text accompanying notes 20-26. 
71. Statement of Philip C. Onstad, Director of Telecommunications Policies, 
Control Data Corporation, in 3 TRANSNATIONAL DATA REPoRT, May 1980, at 17. 
72. Id. at 18. 
73. Opening the Doors for Data Transmission, Bus. WK., Dec. 15, 1980 at 40. 
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and even from providing back-up computer service should the pri-
mary computer malfunction. 74 Under pressure from the United 
States Trade Representative, the Japanese government agreed to tell 
the KDD to drop the restriction. 75 
The adverse economic impact of information processing done out-
side one's own country has been decried by several national govern-
ment representatives. The French Finance Ministry noted in 1978 
that France's economic balance turned on the resolution of the trans-
border information flow issue. 76 Canada has expressed fears that by 
1985 United States processing of Canadian information could result 
in "a loss of some 23,000 directly related jobs from the Canadian 
economy" and that a build-up of a Canadian information processing 
industry is neeessary "for the future economic well being of the 
nation." 77 
Protection of domestic computer service and computer manufac-
turing companies is not all that is going on today. Many European 
telephone and telegraph monopolies, called "PTTs" (postal, tele-
phone, and telegraph) are beginning to try to raise their revenues as 
carriers of transborder data flows. They are doing it by refusing to 
lease complete telephone lines to private users the way lines have 
been leased in the past. 
Until recently, a company with a high volume of either telephone 
or computer traffic could ask a PTT to set aside a particular long 
distance line for the company's exclusive use. The PTT would charge 
a flat monthly fee for leasing the line; the company could transmit 
whatever it wanted to, whenever it wanted to, and the monthly fee 
remained constant. 
To take advantage of the flexibility that flat-rate pricing offered, 
financial institutions set up the Society of Worldwide Interbank 
Financial Telecommunications ("SWIFT") in 1973.78 SWIFT was to 
lease a large number of lines throughout Europe and use them as a 
network for transmitting financial information between banks. 79 
74. Id. 
75. Marlcoslti, Telecommunications Regulations as Barriers to the Transbordtr 
Flow of Information, 14 CoRNELL INT'L L.J. 287, 315-17 {1981). 
76. Bigelow, Transborder Data Flow Barriers, JuRIMETIIICS J., Fall, 1979 at 8, 13 
& n.33. 
77. Id. at 13, quoting from P. Robinson, Strategic Issues Related to Transborder 
Data Flow, in Transnational Data Regulation: The Realities 22-2, 22-6 {QED Info 
Services, Inc. and Online Conferences, Ltd., Wellesley, Mass., 1979). 
78. Marlcoslti, supra note 75, at 298-99. 
79. Id. 
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The plan ran aground when the PTTs decided to lease lines only for 
a combination of a flat basic monthly charge, plus a charge for each 
message sent. 80 Under the PTT-proposed pricing scheme, SWIFTs 
projected costs for the network would have increased by 200 to 400 
percent for European transmissions and by 1000 percent for Europe-
to-North-America transmissions. 81 
At the same time, the PTTs are providing computer networks of 
their own for the public's use. These networks-collections of tele-
phone cables set aside for the purpose-offer control of and account-
ing for each computer message sent. In addition, a subscriber can 
direct an assortment of messages to go to different receiving com-
puters. In short, the PTTs are beginning to offer more than just 
copper cables for the public's use, but are building exactly the kinds 
of computer networks that private organizations like SWIFT have 
been doing or trying to do in the past. 
The result will almost certainly be the diminished availability of 
flat-rate leasing and an increased reliance on "volume sensitive" 
pricing. 82 Many commentators decry this shift, and some even see it 
as "a barrier to the free flow of information."83 
Multi-national corporations, especially in the banking and insur-
ance industries, no doubt resent the shift in PTT attitudes. These 
users have an enormous volume of computer messages to transmit 
daily, 84 and would be happier to control their own networks than to 
rely on a PTT network and its likely higher costs. Yet complaints 
about the PTTs really resolve into an accusation that they are no 
longer doing business the way they used to, that they no longer see 
themselves in the business of providing copper cables, but now see 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Eger, supra note 24, at 217-19; HOWle Hearings, supra note 26, at 157 (state-
ment of B.C. Burgess, Director, Telecommunications Regulatory Policy, Bank of 
America National Trust & Savings Ass'n). 
83. See, e.g., Markoski, supra note 75, at 300. Markoski even notes that Italian 
P'IT efforts to discourage flat-rate leasing of communications lines have "[t]he un-
abashed purpose ... to 'safeguard' P'IT revenues." I d. at 303, citing CCITT Study 
Group III, Rates for Private Leased Circuits, Doc. COM III-No.6-E (Feb. 1977) 
(Italian Administration). 
84. The Motorola Corporation, for example, maintains two communications net-
works that tie together 200 Motorola locations around the world. One network 
handles messages to and from people, taking the place of telephone or telegraph 
communications. This network handles about 165,000 messages per month. 
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themselves in the business of information transmission, or telecom-
munications, or something else. 
Unless it violates national or international law, what is wrong 
with that? First, all successful companies evolve with the times, and 
nowhere is the pace of evolution more rapid than in the computer 
and communications fields. Those who want multi-national corpo-
rations to be able to develop increasingly sophisticated communica-
tions networks, but would deny to the PTTs that same right, are 
asking too much. 
Second, if there continues to be a profitable market for flat-rate 
leased lines, one would expect them to be offered. If substantially 
more profits are available by withdrawing those lines from the 
market and offering them with a different pricing structure, one. 
cannot reasonably expect the PTTs to give up those profits to other 
companies. 85 · 
Third, complaints that the cost of acquiring or using a network, 
will go up by some large percentage overlook the possibility of 
offsetting cost advantages. For example, if a PTT puts the sophistica-
tion of automatic message delivery into a network, then presumably 
the user of the network saves the cost of providing that facility 
himself. The costs may or may not balance out, but in either event 
the increased PTT price over a simple leased line is not likely to be 
pure excess. 
THE GATT 
Undoubtedly an indigenous information industry is becoming in-
creasingly significant to national economies in what is frequently 
The second network handles computerized information such as inventory data, 
payroll and accounting data, and sales data. This network relies on twenty-six leased 
communications cables and on satellite channels, connects 102 high speed computer 
printers and over 4,000 remote computer terminals to two geographically separate 
computer centers, and transmits-daily-about 1.5 billion individual letters and dig-
its around the world. See House Hearings, supra note 26, at 159-62 (statement of 
Gaige Paulsen, Corporate Director of Telecommunications, Motorola, Inc.). 
85. The PTTs are state-sanctioned monopolies, and do not necessarily operate on 
the basis of profitability. If they choose to rely on "public service" or "customer 
desires" instead, then perhaps they will continue to lease lines for a flat rate. The 
point, however, is that no one should be surprised or offended if the PTT's operate to 
maximize revenues or profits-regardless of what that means for the availability of 
flat-rate pricing. 
Some of the PTTs are even considering a deregulation of the communications 
industry, and are watching the current deregulation in the United States with much 
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termed "the Information Age."86 But manufacturing, agriculture, 
fishing, and other industries are well established in importance al-
ready-despite that nations diverge sharply in their capacities in 
each of those areas. The question for the world's information indus-
try, then, is not whether that industry is increasingly important-it 
is-but rather to what extent nations may lawful inhibit or control 
the international commerce in information to effect a build-up of 
their own local industries. 
This is precisely the sort of question, of course, that arises fre-
quently under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
("GATT"). Article III requires "that internal ... laws, regulations 
and requirements affecting the internal sale, . . . purchase, trans-
portation, distribution or use of products" be uniformly applied to 
dome5tic and imported products so as not to favor a nation's domes-
tic industry. This requirement is subject to certain general exceptions 
listed in Article XX, but the examples of the German requirements 
for local computer processing87 and the Japanese foot dragging on 
approval of a communications cable for an American company88 
seem not to fit any reasonable construction of GATT exceptions. 
One possible loophole to even a rigorous enforcement of Article 
III, however, is the question whether information is a "product." To 
date, most discussions of international computer processing have 
assumed that that processing constitutes a "service" and hence is 
outside the scope of the GATT. Indeed, efforts in the fall of 1982 to 
bring services under the GATT umbrella failed. 89 
Not everything transmitted internationally needs to be considered 
a service, however. Indeed, information itself is classifiable in sev-
eral ways. One method is to divide it into "ideational" information, 
like news dispatches, personal messages, TV programs, etc., and 
information as a "commodity,"90 like the LEXIS case law reports 
interest. See House Hearings, supra note 26, at 158, (statement of B.C. Burgess, 
Director, Telecommunications Regulatory Policy, Bank of America National Trust & 
Savings Ass'n). A free market in communications would presumably bring to the fore 
whatever services make the most overall economic sense, whether that maximized 
using companies' profits, the offering PTT's profits, or neither. 
86. Eger, supra note 22, at 1061. 
87. See text accompanying note 71 supra. 
88. See text accompanying note 72 supra. 
89. Farnsworth, Trade Talk Topics Are Determined; Focus Will Be On Inoest-
ment And Seroices, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1982, at D1, col. 6; Pine, GATT Talks Face 
Problems as Negotiators Fail to Agree on Any Big Issue on Agenda, Wall St. J., Oct. 
25, 1982, at 5E, col. 1; Farnsworth, A Reporter's Notebook: Behind the Scenes at the 
GATT Trade Talks in Geneva, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1982, at FB, col. 3. 
90. See Eger, supra note 24, at 233. 
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discussed earlier. 91 Another proposed classification divides informa-
tion into three sets: "final consumption," like news dispatches; 
"semi-finished goods," like raw sales figures that will be "refined" 
into computerized summaries and graphs; and "capital goods," like 
computer programs being transmitted elsewhere for resale or use. 92 
Still another possibility is to distinguish information sought by the 
recipient for personal use from that sought for business use or infor-
mation sought for the sake of knowledge, such as a computerized 
encyclopedia entry, from that sent to the recipient to direct his 
actions, such as "sell 20 shares of IBM." 
All these classifications suggest, if nothing else, that information 
communicated over international networks is not obviously just a 
service, but may well be a product. The question of just what 
information is a product and what is a service has come up outside 
the GATT in a number of United States tax cases. Typically, the 
taxing authority's interest centers on two things: compilations of 
information, such as a computerized telephone book or computer-
ized bibliography, and computer programs (the "capital goods" re-
ferred to earlier). The question most frequently asked is whether 
either form of information is tangible property and hence subject to 
the personal property tax. 93 
In practice, courts in the United States have reached different 
answers to the question, 94 but the lesson for GATT members is that 
at least some forms of internationally communicated information 
can reasonably be classified as products. At least these forms, such as 
91. See text accompanying notes 12-15, supra. 
92. Eger, supra note 24, at 223 n.106, citing a proposal by Alain Madec, chairman 
of the French Commission on Transborder Data F1ows. 
93. Note that the "tangible-intangible" distinction is not necessarily the same as 
the "goods-services" distinction. See, e.g., Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, 
Inc., 457 F. Supp. 765, 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other 
grounds, 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979), where the district court applied New York State 
law to find that "[a]lthough the ideas or concepts involved [in the computer programs] 
remained Honeywell's intellectual property, Triangle was purchasing the product of 
those concepts .... [T]hough intangible, [that product] is more readily characterized 
as 'goods' than 'services.' " 
94. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Universal Computer Associates, 465 F.2d 
516 (D.C. Cir. 1972); First National Bank of Springfield v. Dept. of Revenue, 85 
Ill.2d 84, 421 N.E.2d 175 (1981); Fingerhut Products Co. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 258 
N.W.2d 606 (Minn. 1977) (mailing lists intangible except as labels to be affixed to 
envelopes); Spencer Gifts, Inc. v. Taxation Div. Director, 182 N.J. Super. 179, 440 
A.2d 104 (1981) (cards encoded with program analogous to paper in attorney's provi-
sion of a will, part of a service); Commerce Union Bank v. Tidewell, 538 S.W.2d 405 
(1976) (sale of programs is service). 
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computerized encyclopedias, stock market reports, scientific ab-
stracts, and case law reports, ought to be the subject of existing 
GATT agreements without need of further discussion on the GATT 
and services. 
CoNCLUSION 
As information sales around the world expand prodigiously, na-
tions are rushing to protect and foster their own domestic computer 
and information industries. Existing international agreements like 
the GATT may well be applicable to these sales, but to date these 
agreements do not seem to be invoked to lessen protectionist mea-
sures. Yet information is an extraordinary product: with satellite 
communications now available to much of the world, information 
can be "shipped" readily from almost anywhere to almost anywhere 
else. The structure and function of a global market where the time to 
deliver goods is virtually zero are as yet taking shape; 95 perhaps the 
old agreements-even if adhered to-will not suffice to sustain and 
nurture this new trade. But agreements or not, the trade appears 
likely to mushroom in volume and economic importance in the near 
future. The problems it gives rise to deserve more thoughtful atten-
tion than they have been getting. 
See also Heinzman, Computer Software: Should it be Treated as Tangible Property 
for Ad Valorem TcuP, 37 J. TAX 184 (1972) (arguing for intangibility); Comment, 
Software Taxation: A Critical Reevaluation of the Notion of Intangibility, 1980 
B.Y.U.L.REv. 859 (1980). 
95. See generally, Eger, The Brussels Mandate: An Alliance for the Future of 
World Communications and Information Policy, 3 CoMPUTER NETWORKS 79 (1979) 
(printing a speech by transborder data flow consultant John Eger given at a confer-
ence in Brussels, Belgium in February 1978). Mr. Eger, formerly head of the White 
House Office of Telecommunications Policy, has often decried the United States' lack 
of a coherent policy addressing the new problems and opportunities of the information 
industry. See Eger, Competition and Changing Order: The Need for a National 
Information Policy, 16 CoMMUNICATIONS NEWs 22 (1979). The less developed coun-
tries have begun to call for their own novel policies in this area in the form of a "new 
world information order." See, e.g., The Global First Amendment War, TIME, Octo-
ber 6, 1980, at 62 (an essay). 
